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Sentencing the Multiple Offender
In Search of a “Just and Proportionate” Total Sentence
A n d r e w  A s h wo rt h  a n d  M a rt i n   Wa s i k
The multiple offender will receive a shorter (perhaps much shorter) sentence 
if she or he is dealt with for several offenses on a single sentencing occasion 
than if sentenced for those same offenses on two or more separate sentencing 
occasions. This is the “discount for bulk offending,” a practice which is widely 
adopted in different sentencing systems but which is hard to justify theoretically, 
either in retributive or deterrent terms. In this chapter we focus on custodial 
sentences, where the issues are at their most stark.
In England, the jurisdiction with which we are mainly concerned in this chap-
ter, the tools for determining custodial sentences in the case of multiple offend-
ers are threefold: concurrent sentences, consecutive sentences, and the totality 
principle. Custodial sentences imposed on the same sentencing occasion in 
England cannot overlap. This means that the total sentence must always be 
arrived at through a combination of concurrent and/ or consecutive sentences.
We begin the chapter by attempting to identify the rationale of the totality 
principle, examining how it operates and seeking a justification for the principle. 
We then turn to scrutinize the component parts of the totality principle, exam-
ining six problematic issues. We then develop our argument that totality should 
be regarded as the determining principle when sentencing for multiple offenses, 
discussing the approach of some other jurisdictions before formulating what we 
regard as necessary changes in the sentencing guidelines for England and Wales.
Identifying the Rationale of the Totality Principle
The totality principle applies to all multiple- offense cases, whatever combina-
tion of concurrent or consecutive sentences a particular judge adopts. Whether 
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sentences are imposed concurrently, or consecutively, or in a mix, the total sen-
tence should, in principle, be unaffected. The practical operation of this prin-
ciple can clearly be seen in many English appellate decisions. If the Court of 
Appeal finds that the judge has achieved totality in his or her sentence then only 
rarely will the Court quibble about the particular combination of concurrent 
and / or consecutive sentences which were employed by the judge to reach that 
result. The overriding requirement when sentencing multiple offenders is that 
the judge has reflected totality— an appropriate overall custodial sentence.
Three questions need to be addressed in connection with the central concept 
of totality. First, how does the totality principle operate? Secondly, what is the 
rationale for the principle? And thirdly, what are its component elements?
First, the operation of the totality principle (in outline). Everyone agrees 
that in the case of a multiple offender the total sentence should be greater than 
the proportionate sentence for any one of the offenses. This is true whether the 
judge employs consecutive or concurrent sentences, or a mixture of both, to 
achieve the final outcome. The totality principle, however, operates to restrict 
the sentence that might otherwise result from adding together the single sen-
tences for each of the offenses. This restrictive principle applies so as to reduce 
the sentence for someone who has committed several offenses, whether these 
were committed close together in time or over a considerable period.
This prompts the question (posed forcefully by Reitz, 2010, p. 138) of why 
the multiple offender’s sentence is restricted when the repeat offender who is 
caught and sentenced on each separate occasion receives enhanced sentences 
(not restricted sentences) on account of the persistence of the offending. 
Before confronting that question, two preliminary points must be noted. First, 
one should beware of exaggerating the difference between those two sentenc-
ing approaches. Desert theory does allow modest increases in sentence for 
persistent offenders, subject to a “ceiling” reached after three or four offenses, 
after which there should be no further increases (an approach clearly reflected 
in Crown Court sentencing practice; see Roberts and Pina- Sanchez, 2014). 
Multiple offenders do receive an incremental increase for each subsequent 
offense, although the size of the increment diminishes as the number of offenses 
rises. Empirical evidence is lacking here, but the rarity with which Crown Court 
judges exceed the “offense range” set out in sentencing guidelines strongly sug-
gests that sentences passed for multiple offenses do generally fall within the 
same broad parameters as sentences passed for a single offense. However, that 
said, the difference in approach remains considerable, and the responses to both 
multiple offenders (sentenced “simultaneously,” as Frase 2013, ch. 4, puts it) and 
persistent offenders (sentenced “sequentially”) ideally ought to be incorporated 
into a single and consistent matrix.
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Justifying the Principle
The second preliminary point is that the presence of multiple offenses and 
the presence of previous offenses on the offender’s record are each taken into 
account at two stages of reasoning. At the first stage the presence of the other 
offenses requires that the total sentence imposed on the present occasion is 
always higher than it otherwise would be. A serious prior criminal record, the 
presence of other offenses for which the offender is being sentenced at the 
same time (and “offenses taken into consideration,” for that matter),1 all serve 
to increase the seriousness of the case. At the second stage, however, the total 
sentence is scaled back so as to set a limit upon the effect which the presence of 
multiple offenses or offenses on the offender’s record would otherwise have. We 
argue that the previous convictions of the offender with a serious record, and 
the “non- lead offenses” of a multiple offender, simply provide part of the context 
within which the assessment of offense seriousness can fairly be made.
How can the rationale for the totality principle be explained? Three possi-
ble explanations can be considered. First, it might be argued that the multiple 
offender who is sentenced on one occasion for several offenses differs from 
other persistent offenders because the latter have had authoritative warnings 
(in the shape of convictions and sentences) which the multiple offender has 
not received, and indeed may have served sentences that have a criminogenic 
(rather than a rehabilitative) effect. This is certainly a distinction between the 
two classes of offender, but it is not clear that the difference is weighty enough to 
justify the different approaches to sentencing, not least because there is usually 
no question that the multiple offenders knew they were committing offenses and 
were, at that stage, avoiding detection.
Secondly, it is sometimes argued that the basis for the restrictive effect of the 
totality principle lies in the direction of mercy, the principle of parsimony or 
restraint, or even the right to human dignity. These are indeed important prin-
ciples, but it is not clear why they should apply to multiple offenders rather than 
to any offender who is likely to receive a substantial custodial sentence. All such 
sentences are hard, and are likely to have a “crushing effect” on many of those 
subjected to them. However, it is fair to note that one of the problems of con-
secutive sentencing (especially if it operates in an unbridled way) is that it may 
result in a total punishment of years amounting to much of the offender’s remain-
ing life- time or even (illogically) running well beyond that period. Consecutive 
sentences rapidly become nonsensical, particularly with elderly offenders being 
sentenced for multiple historic offenses. In principle— and this is supported by 
the right to human dignity— the total sentence imposed on an offender should 
always be one which is capable of being served within the offender’s lifetime 
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(subject to the whole- life minimum term issue, considered in Vinter v.  UK 
[2013] and Hutchinson v. UK [2015]).
Thirdly, and notwithstanding the fact that the two arguments seem less than 
compelling, it appears that a majority of members of the public support some 
kind of totality principle (see Robinson and Darley, 1995, p. 193; Roberts, 2008, 
pp. 180– 182), and that intuitively interoffense proportionality is the dominant 
consideration. In other words, several lesser offenses should not combine to pro-
duce a sentence above that which is appropriate for a significantly more serious 
offense. Thus, while part of the thrust of this rationale is that it is based on public 
opinion, its deeper roots lie in the intuitive attraction of a version of proportion-
ality theory that privileges interoffense proportionality above intraoffense pro-
portionality. In other words, the primary determinant of proportionality here 
is the most serious of the offenses for which sentence is being passed, rather 
than the sheer number of lesser offenses. There is some philosophical support 
for the “strong intuitive basis” for the reduction in multiple- offense sentencing 
(see Bennett, 2012, p. 138). We would concede that there may be combinations 
of facts that challenge the intuitive attraction of interoffense proportionality (see 
Reitz, 2010, p. 146), but in many cases the primacy of interoffense proportional-
ity is a reasonable starting- point.
What Are the Component Parts of the 
Totality Principle?
Without concluding our tentative discussion of rationales, it is now appropriate 
to examine the component elements of the totality principle. A major element is 
the proposition that it is inappropriate to sentence the multiple offender simply 
by doing the arithmetic and adding together the sentences for the individual 
offenses. The Sentencing Council moves from this proposition to the repeated 
assertion that the sentence must be “just and proportionate,” without further 
elaboration (Sentencing Council, 2012, criticized by Ashworth, 2015, pp. 282– 
286). This formulation should be rejected on the ground that it ducks the issues 
and leaves relatively unbridled judicial discretion. While (as we elaborate in 
the next section) a major purpose of multiple- offense sentencing should be to 
achieve proper presentation and communication, the notion of totality is depen-
dent on the resolution of some tough normative questions.
What goes into judgments of totality? For example, is there not a significant 
difference between three or four offenses arising out of the same incident, and 
three or four offenses committed over a period of time? In calculating totality 
there must surely be a difference between these two types of core case; although 
it is true that (a)  there are some contestable cases where the idea of a single 
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incident is stretched as a concept (for examples, see Wasik, 2012, pp. 294– 297) 
and (b) there is at least a presentational argument for a different approach where, 
for example, different legal prohibitions have been violated in the incident. This 
is not about consecutive or concurrent sentences; it is about the elements that go 
to make up totality, ensuring that there is no undercounting or double- counting. 
Similarly, when calculating totality, should it matter whether several offenses 
were committed against the same victim or against different victims?
These are among the questions we need to answer, in order to unpack the 
notion of a just and proportionate overall sentence. In the following section we 
set out six possible aspects of the relationship between the offenses to be sen-
tenced, that may affect the quantum of the total sentence— factors that tend to 
move the total sentence upward or downward:
 1) The genuine single incident (the nonproblematic cases); such as the rob-
bery with a carried weapon or the burglary with a weapon. In principle, if 
there are two charges (robbery, carrying an offensive weapon) the sentence 
should be the same as it would be if only robbery were charged and the car-
rying of the weapon were treated as a factor aggravating the robbery. It can 
fairly be regarded as a single incident or single transaction. Thus, if a person 
were charged with a robbery last week and carrying an offensive weapon this 
week, these two offenses cannot be seen as a single incident and one might 
therefore expect the total sentence to be higher than in the “single incident/ 
transaction” case. However, as one of us has argued before (Wasik, 2012), 
the boundaries are often blurred and so there are limits to the usefulness 
of the “single incident” concept. Thus, consider a case where D commits a 
house burglary to take the car keys, steals the high performance car belong-
ing to the householder, and then drives it dangerously, ultimately resulting 
in a police chase and D’s arrest. These three offenses are certainly linked 
together (in time and context), but it is not very helpful to ask whether this 
is one incident or two or three. In order to achieve totality one would expect 
there to be some aggregation of the sentences for the burglary, the theft and 
the dangerous driving.
 2) Where there is a series of similar offenses over a period of time, the best 
approach is to aggregate the offenses and to sentence as if it is a composite 
offense. This is straightforward where there is a series of benefit frauds, or 
thefts from an employer, where it is possible to aggregate the loss/ gain into 
a single total. Where there is a series of similar sexual or physical abuse cases 
over time, this aggregative approach may still be adopted in principle, but the 
detailed approach is likely to be different. Several offenses of assault occasion-
ing bodily harm could be cumulated by adding the sentences together, and 
the same for a series of sexual offenses; but whereas the approach to repeated 
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property offenses is to produce a figure for total gain/ loss, the approach to 
other offenses is to aggregate the individual sentences. This would clearly engage 
the restrictive element of the totality principle; but should not the aggregation 
of gain/ loss in property offenses also engage the totality principle?
 3) Where the series of offenses is committed against the same victim, is this 
more or less serious than the same offenses against different victims? The 
Sentencing Council seems to say different things, by suggesting that repeti-
tive thefts from the same person should usually attract concurrent sentences 
whereas repetitive offenses of domestic violence or sexual offense against 
the same person should attract consecutive sentences (Sentencing Council, 
2012, pp. 6– 7). Admittedly these remarks do not relate to the totality prin-
ciple directly, but there is a strong implication in the Council’s discussion 
that the totality principle may exert a more restrictive effect when property 
offenses are committed against the same person than when sexual offenses 
or domestic abuse are committed. There seems to be no good reason to dis-
tinguish between repeated victimization of the same person and of different 
persons, unless there is evidence that a vulnerable person was targeted— an 
independent aggravating factor.
 4) If one or more of the offenses are committed while on bail for another offense 
being sentenced on the same occasion, this should raise the total sentence by a 
significant amount.2 Two reasons for this are that (a) the new offense is clearly 
separated in time from the original offense, and (b) offending on bail violates a 
separate interest, in the sense that an important element of trust is breached by 
the commission of offenses while awaiting a court hearing on other charges.
 5) If one or more of the offenses involve assault on the police, for example to try to 
escape arrest in relation to another offense being sentenced on the same occa-
sion, this should raise the sentence by a significant amount. Two reasons for 
this are that (a) the new offense is likely to violate a separate interest (unless the 
original offense was also an attack on the police), and (b) this separate interest 
is one that requires extra protection, since police officers are required to place 
themselves in vulnerable positions in order to carry out their public duties.
 6) If one of the offenses is an offense against the administration of justice com-
mitted in relation to another offense being sentenced, this should raise the 
sentence by a significant amount. This is along similar lines to point (4), but 
it relates to offenses such as perverting the course of justice, as by trying to 
conceal evidence or to claim that the offense was committed by another or 
to bribe a witness to keep quiet. The main rationales for this would, again, be 
that the offense violates a separate and socially important interest.
These six factors are relevant to determining whether the total sentence should be 
adjusted upward or downward, and therefore to the principle that the sentence 
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of the multiple offender should attempt to reflect the offending behavior as a 
whole. Where should the court start in its assessment of totality? Other jurisdic-
tions have tackled this problem by developing formulae to guide sentencers in 
arriving at totality in multiple- offense cases. In Germany, for example, the tradi-
tional model has been to give full penal weight to the most serious offense to be 
sentenced and then to add to that figure roughly half of the total penal weight 
attaching to the sum of all the other offenses. An account of this is provided 
by Jareborg (1998, pp.  135– 137), describing the work of Hans- Jorg Albrecht 
and Joachim Bohnert. A more elaborate model has been developed in Sweden, 
whereby full penal weight is given to the most serious offense, to which is added 
half of the penal weight for the second most serious offense, one third of the 
penal weight for the third most serious offense, and so on. The model, as devel-
oped by Borgeke, a Swedish Appeal Court judge, is considered in more detail by 
Vibla (2013, pp. 86– 88). In Vibla’s interviews with Swedish judges (pp. 89– 104) 
she found a broad acceptance of Borgeke’s approach as a way to achieve greater 
consistency in multiple- offense cases, provided that the formula was applied 
flexibly. This approach certainly has something to recommend it, but the rela-
tionship between the mathematical models and the six factors identified earlier 
needs to be more clearly elaborated. The discussion suggests that interoffense 
proportionality is the key guide, taking the lead offense as a pointer but adding 
incrementally to reflect the other offenses.
From this discussion of the factors that may determine the assessment of 
the total sentence, we now move on to the presentational issue of concurrent/ 
consecutive sentences. There would be some difficulty in accommodating the 
German/ Swedish approach to multiple- offense sentencing within the English 
tradition of concurrent/ consecutive sentencing. In English sentencing practice 
the position is that all the offenses in a multiple- offense case must receive their 
proportionate sentence, but that some or all of those sentences will be ordered 
to run concurrently rather than consecutively, to comply with totality. The sen-
tence imposed for each offense will appear on the offender’s criminal record. 
In the German– Swedish model the sentences for all individual offenses other 
than the lead offense are artificially shortened to achieve totality. It is simply the 
global sentence which then appears on the offender’s record.
Presentation, Communication, and  
the Totality Principle
We take the view that totality is the determining principle when sentencing mul-
tiple offenders, rather than just a limiting principle (as Thomas, 1979, pp. 56– 61 
argued, and as reflected in Sentencing Council guidelines). If we are right that 
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totality is the determining principle, then, if a judge chooses to deal with one of 
the offenses by way of a consecutive sentence, there must be some adjustment to 
sentences for other offenses in order to retain totality. The selection of concurrent 
and consecutive sentences within totality is, for the most part, a matter of presen-
tation of the total sentence (to the defendant, the victim, and the wider public). 
There is no proportionality issue in the choice between concurrent and consecutive 
sentences. Of course presentation is important for communicative reasons, and can 
be particularly so in sensitive cases, such as those involving multiple deaths (see the 
examples in Wasik, 2012, pp. 299– 301). While it is possible to imagine the English 
sentencing system operating without consecutive sentences at all, the importance 
of presentation in some cases means that there is value in their occasional use. There 
should, however, be a clear presumption in favor of concurrent sentences.
The most straightforward case, perhaps, is one where there is a clear lead 
offense in terms of seriousness, and then one or more lesser offenses. The prin-
ciple is to pass a somewhat enhanced sentence for the lead offense (enhanced by 
treating the other offenses as aggravating the lead offense) and then to use con-
current sentences for the rest. This principle certainly applies both at the lower 
end of the custodial sentencing scale (for example, dangerous driving, plus no 
tax, no insurance) and at the higher end. For example, in Pinnell (2011) the Court 
of Appeal said that where an extended sentence is to be imposed on a multiple 
offender all the offenses should be looked at in the round before imposing the 
extended sentence for the most serious matter and passing concurrent sentences 
for the rest. Then there is the case of several offenses (say, assault) committed 
against the same victim, or against different victims. Generally, this is better dealt 
with by concurrent rather than consecutive sentences because (especially if there 
are more than two offenses) using consecutive terms means that some or all of the 
assaults have to be undersentenced to keep within totality. Concurrent sentences 
allow the judge to pass a proportionate sentence for each assault.
The most difficult case is where the offender falls to be sentenced for two 
entirely unrelated matters (burglary committed on one occasion and assault 
on another). Some would prefer consecutive sentences here, but that approach 
requires each sentence to be shorter than it would be if standing alone. 
Concurrence allows the judge to pass appropriate sentences for each matter, and 
thereby to impose a proportionate overall sentence. If, as sometimes happens, 
the defendant faces charges on two separate but unrelated indictments, the best 
approach may be to select the lead offenses from each of the two indictments, 
pass consecutive sentences for those and concurrent sentences for all the rest.
In the context of the sentencing guidelines for England and Wales, our argu-
ments in this chapter point to the need for two major changes— the first relating 
to the standard contents of the offense guidelines, and the second relating to the 
generic guideline for sentencing multiple offenders.
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Offense Guidelines
On the first point, we think that the totality principle should be more clearly incor-
porated into offense guidelines, which have hitherto focused on single offenses and 
have largely ignored the complexities of multiple offending. Given the frequency 
with which multiple offenses are sentenced, and the determining role of totality, it 
is not appropriate to relegate totality to step 6 of the Sentencing Council’s guide-
lines, as it currently is.3 In addition to step 6 (which we think should be retained as 
a useful check), more detailed guidance should be given earlier, at step 2 (starting 
point and category range). Guidelines at step 2 set out a table of “factors increasing 
seriousness” and “factors reducing seriousness or reflecting personal mitigation,” 
and typically contain the following wording (e.g., guideline on Assault, 2011):
The table  .  .  .  contains a non- exhaustive list of additional factual ele-
ments providing the context of the offence and factors relating to the 
offender. Identify whether any combination of these, or other relevant 
factors, should result in an upward or downward adjustment from the 
starting point. In some cases, having considered these factors, it may be 
appropriate to move outside the identified category range.
The table does not cater for multiple offenses, and indeed there is no mention 
of the issue at all. In something of a change of direction, a recently published 
offense guideline (on Theft Offences, 2016)  contains the following additional 
statement at step 2:
The table . . . refers to single offences. Where there are multiple offences 
consecutive sentences may be appropriate: please refer to the Offences 
Taken into Consideration and Totality guideline.
This wording appears in relation to some of the particular offenses covered 
(general theft, theft from a shop, handling stolen goods, and going equipped 
for theft), but not others (abstracting electricity and making off without pay-
ment). It seems clear from the context that the reference in the guideline to mul-
tiple offenses is meant to be limited to multiple instances of the same particular 
offense, and not to sentencing multiple offenses more generally.4
We think that more assistance should be provided, and suggest that the fol-
lowing should be incorporated at step 2 of each offense guideline:
If sentencing the offender for more than one offence:
 (i) There is a presumption in favor of passing concurrent sentences for all 
offences being dealt with, but in some cases consecutive sentences may 
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be appropriate: please refer to the Offences Taken into Consideration and 
Totality guideline.
 (ii) It will normally be appropriate to pass a total sentence which is within the 
category range appropriate to the most serious of the offences, although 
the presence of one or more other offences (whether similar to or differ-
ent from the most serious offence) will normally require the adoption of 
a higher starting point than would be appropriate for a single offence. In 
some cases, having considered these factors it may be appropriate to move 
outside the identified category range.
And, in the table column “Factors Increasing Seriousness:  Other Aggravating 
Factors Include” the following additional wording should appear:
Offender being sentenced for more than one offence.
English Guideline on Totality
Moving to the second major change that is necessary, we would recommend 
reconsideration of the Sentencing Council’s guideline on Offences taken into 
Consideration and Totality (2012), so as to make it clear that the totality prin-
ciple is a determining principle that should form an important part of the court’s 
reasoning from step 2 onward in all multiple- offense cases, rather than simply 
a late- stage check at step 6 to see whether the sentence intuitively seems too 
high. There are some features of the totality guideline with which we agree. We 
agree that when sentencing a multiple offender the court “should pass a total 
sentence which reflects all the offending behaviour . . . whether the sentences are 
constructed as concurrent or consecutive,” and that “there is no inflexible rule 
governing whether sentences should be . . . concurrent or consecutive.”
We disagree, however, with the Sentencing Council’s general approach that 
the court should “consider the sentence for each individual offence,” then “deter-
mine whether the case calls for concurrent or consecutive sentences,” and then 
“test the overall sentence(s) against the requirement that they be just and pro-
portionate.” At present the guideline usefully summarizes the earlier case- law on 
the use of concurrent and consecutive sentences, but actually says nothing about 
the proper role of the totality principle, and gives no clues as to how the court 
should assess totality in any particular case. What appears at step 6 in the offense 
guidelines under totality principle is:
If sentencing an offender for more than one offence . . . consider whether 
the total sentence is just and proportionate to the offending behaviour.
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Neither this statement, nor the totality guideline as a whole, assists a judge in 
selecting the just and proportionate sentence for all the offending behavior. So, 
what additional ground should a revised totality guideline cover?
We said earlier that the most straightforward multiple offense case is one 
where there is a clear lead offense in terms of seriousness, and then one or more 
lesser offenses. We think that the advice should be for the judge to move at step 
1 to the category range appropriate for the lead offense. The judge should always 
explain his or her conclusion on step 1 before moving to step 2, as required by 
the decision in Attorney- General’s References (Nos 15, 16 and 17 of 2012) (2013). 
Almost inevitably, the presence of multiple offenses will justify a move upward 
within the category range. There will be some cases where the presence of mul-
tiple offenses (taken together with all other factors) will require the court to 
move up from one category range to the next. Moving from one category range 
to another is not a departure from the offense guideline, but it was said in Datsun 
(2014) that it was always desirable for the judge to explain why this has occurred. 
Very occasionally the presence of multiple offenses (taken together with all 
other factors) may justify a provisional sentence at the end of step 2 (prior to 
any reduction for a guilty plea, etc.) which is above the top of the offense range. 
To arrive at a sentence above the top of the offense range is a departure from the 
offense guideline and would require the judge to explain that to pass a sentence 
within the offense range would be contrary to the interests of justice (Coroners 
and Justice Act, 2009, s.125(1)).
Pausing there, it is worth noting in more detail the empirical evidence which 
shows that in practice in the Crown Court upward departures from offense guide-
lines are very rare (Sentencing Council, 2014). In 2014 they occurred in 2% of 
cases involving assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 3% of cases of domestic 
burglary, and 0.5% of cases of cultivation of cannabis. These figures strongly sug-
gest that in the great majority of cases the upper category range in the offense 
guidelines is perfectly adequate to deal with the worst multiple- offense cases. 
Ordinarily in the offense guidelines there is a significant gap between the top 
of the offense range and the maximum penalty for the offense to cater for cases 
where the court does need to depart from the guideline. For assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm the top of the offense range is three years but the maximum 
is five years. For domestic burglary the top of the offense range is six years but 
the maximum is 14 years. For cultivation of cannabis the top of the offense range 
is 10 years but the maximum is 14 years. In very rare cases aggravating factors, 
including the presence of multiple offenses, may justify the passing of a final sen-
tence which is higher than the maximum penalty for any one of the offenses 
being sentenced. Sentencing in excess of the maximum can only be achieved by 
the use of consecutive sentences. The recent offense guideline on general theft 
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(theft carries a maximum penalty of seven years) recognizes that, and contains 
the following statement at step 2:
Where multiple offences are committed in circumstances which jus-
tify consecutive sentences and the total amount stolen is in excess of 
£1 million, then an aggregate sentence in excess of seven years may be 
appropriate.
This is the first time that such a statement has appeared in an offense guideline,5 
and there is no explanation given in the text for singling out the offense of theft in 
this way. It could be taken as confirmation that the Crown Court should not nor-
mally use consecutive sentences to exceed the maximum. As we have seen, the 
maximum for assault occasioning actual bodily harm is five years, so the infer-
ence is that no matter how many instances of that offense are being sentenced 
on the same occasion the sentence should never exceed five years before adjust-
ment for guilty plea and any other matters. Relatively technical these issues may 
be, but they ought to be resolved if the sentencing guidelines system is to cater 
properly for the sentencing of multiple offenses.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have sought to confront some of the difficult practical issues 
that arise in multiple- offense sentencing, and to place them in the context of 
the strongest justification for the totality principle. Our argument is that total-
ity should be regarded as the determining principle when sentencing multiple 
offenders, rather than simply as a limiting principle. We also argue that the choice 
between concurrent and consecutive sentencing should be seen as a presenta-
tional and communicative issue, and we make concrete proposals about ways in 
which the totality principle should be reformulated in the generic guidelines on 
totality, and more clearly incorporated into the various offense guidelines issued 
by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales.
Notes
 1. The English practice of taking offenses into consideration means that an offender who is about 
to be sentenced can ask the court to take account of other offenses that he admits to commit-
ting but with which he has not been charged. In practice, this usually happens in relation to 
offenses similar to the type for which he is already being sentenced, and the effect will be to 
increase the overall sentence (see further Ashworth, 2015, p. 275).
 2. One cannot prescribe what the incremental increase would be, but it should be a just notice-
able difference in order to signify the violation of this separate interest.
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 3. Some explanation is necessary for those unfamiliar with the structure of the English sentencing 
guidelines. Each guideline relates to one offense or one group of offenses. The court is usually 
required to go through 8 or 9 steps in order to impose the appropriate sentence and orders. In 
brief, step 1 sets out the harm and culpability factors on the basis of which the court should 
determine which offense category the offense falls. Step 2 sets out a number of aggravating and 
mitigating factors that the court may use in order to determine whether to move upward or 
downward from the starting point in the appropriate offense category. Step 3 concerns further 
reductions for assistance to the prosecution; step 4 requires the court to reduce sentence to 
reflect a plea of guilty; step 5 (where applicable) requires the court to have regard to the criteria 
for sentencing dangerous offenders; step 6 is the totality principle; step 7 requires the court to 
consider ancillary orders; step 8 requires the court to formulate its reasons; and step 9 requires 
the court to adjust the sentence accordingly if the defendant was subject to a qualifying curfew 
while remanded on bail.
 4. The new wording does not appear in relation to abstracting electricity. It is perhaps unlikely 
that a defendant would fall to be sentenced for multiple instances of that offense, but abstract-
ing electricity is commonly encountered as an offense associated with other offenses, especially 
production of cannabis.
 5. Nor does it appear in relation to the other offenses covered in the Theft Offences guideline, such 
as theft from a shop or handling stolen goods.
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